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MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

I believe that Egypt would be a fascinating subject for a DCI dinner, but do not believe that these reviews provide enough "meat." Since we have an IIM on Egypt in the works, the political stability of Egypt would be more useful and rewarding. I'm sure the DCI would go for this. Herman Eilts at Boston U., Dick Mitchell at Michigan and Bill Quandt at Brookings would be worth having. Let me know your thinking on this.

[redacted]

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between the perceptions of the USA Institute and those of high Soviet officials. If the institute has "access to the top echelons of power" (p. 163), as he asserts, we would like to know why its writings "often differ considerably from the accounts on the same subject appearing in the Soviet media" (p. 6). Schwartz raises the question of the extent of the institute's influence on Soviet policy but does not really answer it.

C. BEN WRIGHT
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In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt *by Leonard Binder. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1978. 437 pp. $22.50.*

Both liberals and Marxists in recent years have had to reassess their earlier expectations that rapid social and economic development in a predictable direction would follow the national awakening of the new states of Africa and Asia. In the Middle East, the collapse of Lebanon has removed the liberals' primary model of democratic development in that region, while the "new middle class" has often conformed more closely to the stagnant and parasitic national bourgeoisie condemned by Fanon than to the standard-bearer of modernization in which writers like Manfred Halpern placed their hopes. At the same time, a strong proletariat has failed to develop, and the gap between the national and social revolutions, which Nasser described in his *Philosophy of the Revolution*, remains as wide as ever.

Leonard Binder's new book on Egypt is a significant academic response both to the vagueness of earlier formulations of tradition, modernity, and the new middle class, and to the realization that development is neither unidirectional nor necessarily very rapid. Drawing on Gaetano Mosca's theory of the "second stratum," Binder demonstrates convincingly that there has been, for over a century, a relatively quiescent and pliable mediating class in Egypt without which the rulers have not been able to rule. This impressive agent of continuity, comprising about 3 percent of the total population of Egypt, or between 700,000 and 1 million people, is the rural middle class. By analyzing nearly 30,000 names in the register of Nasser's mass party, the National Union, Binder establishes significant ancestral links between the contemporary rural middle class and an earlier prerevolutionary agrarian notability whose members were represented in elected assemblies as far back as 1866 under Isma'il Khedive. He further shows that this rural elite has maintained its position and political influence throughout the country through successive reorganizations of the Arab Socialist Union to the present day.

Binder's argument, however, is not that nothing has changed. The bulk of his book is devoted to a rigorous internal analysis of the geographic, occupational, and political characteristics of the second stratum and a series of detailed statistical correlations with indices of modernization, agrarian development, and land ownership. From this data it emerges that the rural elite is most prevalent in the more industrially developed districts [illegible] and "traditional" occupations. These findings are somewhat modified by the greater con-

centration of power that remains in the hands of the less numerous rural elite in upper Egypt. But overall, the correlation with the more highly capitalized agricultural sector and the apparent shift by some segments of the class to more urban settings are reminiscent of Barrington Moore's description of the English aristocracy that gradually "committed decorous suicide" in transforming its economic base.

Binder's important study opens up several new directions for students of Egypt and of the Third World. Historically, he has thrown new light on traditional interpretations of episodes such as the triangular conflict between the Wafd, the monarchy, and the British between the world wars. By showing that the Wafd and the king both needed support from the rural middle class and in fact successively elected many of the same people to parliament, Binder draws attention to a relatively consensual second layer of the political elite that is missed by an exclusive focus on the top leadership. The test of continuity must now be extended to Sadat's latest reorganization of the mass party which, while superficially dramatic, may have produced no greater change of personnel than earlier such reorganizations and changes of name.

Another direction suggested by Binder's work is a close examination of the relationships between the rural elite and other classes such as the landless peasants and the urban bourgeoisie. Although Binder indicates that the mediating task of the rural middle class is performed by its integration into the peasant culture of the village, these links must be empirically verified. And despite Binder's conclusion that there is "a significant hiatus between the urban and rural political arenas" (p. 404), the economic and social boundary between the urbanized elements of the rural middle class and the urban bourgeoisie remains unclear. Similarly, Binder's discussion of the infighting among the top leadership before and after Nasser's death, while fascinating in itself, remains rather detached from the earlier empirical evidence on the rural elite. It is the lack of adequate linkage with other classes that makes the demonstration of a Marxist "moment of enthusiasm," which gives the book its title, somewhat problematical. But that is a task for another book.

Meanwhile, the subtitle of this book, which better reflects its content, indicates a third major direction to be pursued. Binder's historical and statistical analysis of one significant class, not necessarily the most obvious at first sight, and his detailed internal differentiation of the various segments of that class, suggest a focus and a methodology of great importance for comparative analysis. Similar studies in countries like Algeria and India will not only help "to break the epistemological barrier between area studies and behavioral science" (p. xvii), toward which Binder aspires, but will also add an important dimension to studies of modernization and development that could shed new light on many puzzling aspects of Third World revolutions.

RONALD COLMAN
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Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat *by Raymond William Baker. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1978. 290 pp. $16.00.*

Baker's work is exceptionally helpful for understanding Egypt's development during the last quarter-century. A splendid sense of problem and scholarly judgment have produced a volume that is filled with vivid and decisive facts and with analyses of turning points; yet Baker presents it all with impressive brevity, depth, and lucidity. The book's material is based primarily on Arabic sources gathered during prolonged field study.

The story Baker tells is that of two leaders who have both based their power on the military and the security police. A docile technocratic caste, composed in largest plurality of engineers, benefited under both regimes. Under Sadat, middlemen and entrepreneurs also profit. But a new political community has not been created. Baker draws upon Egyptian independent leftists, and at times on the independent-minded and very able Soviet scholar G. I. Mirsky, to make some of his most telling points. He sums up one Egyptian critic this way: A genuinely new community "could not be realized by elite manipulation, no matter how bold. Such a revolution could only mean the self-transformation of a people. Such a self-transformation in turn necessitated supportive institutional and intellectual structures. Judged by this standard, the rule of Anwar es-Sadat so far has been as disappointing as that of his predecessor" (pp. 239–240). I share this judgment. Giving it such space in this review, however, is a bit misleading. The greatest virtue of this book stems from its more specific analysis of the complexities and underlying reasons for this failure in the history of the original military conspirators, the Egyptian bureaucracy, the political organization, the agricultural cooperatives, rural health care, and the regime's orientation to foreign policy. The barriers to transformation are shown to have become deeper, in part because power has become both more personalized and more bureaucratized.

Baker is right in illuminating for us a group of military conspirators moving toward Nasser's coup of 1952 who were more united by personal ties than by explicit ideological positions; more pushed by contingencies than by their own historical decisions. Other scholars (including myself) had not been able to ascertain these characteristics as clearly in the early 1960s. He shows that these attributes have continued to mark the Egyptian top elite's style right to the present. This elite has also remained far more solicitous for and dependent upon the army and secret police than on the rest of its people. Its greatest payoffs and losses, even for its domestic development, have come from its investment in a succession of foreign policies.

This elite was correspondingly wary of creating a revolutionary vanguard. For people generally, therefore, "the primary motives for joining the mass parties [created by Nasser] were the nonideological—even conservative—ones of protecting existing rights, maintaining social prestige, securing redress of specific grievances, and possibly attaining minimal qualifications for cooption into the higher echelons of the state" (p. 99). As a result, the economy is bankrupt, but in Sadat's days the new wealth of "the survivors of the old liberal bourgeoisie, the inherited state bourgeoisie, and the newly emergent parasitic bourgeoisie . . . has angered the mass of the Egyptian people" (p. 151). Sadat has thus reinforced "pressures, especially class pressures, that one day may in fact bring more fundamental changes" (p. 169).

There is, as yet, no reason to suppose that the fundamentally new society to come in Egypt will also be fundamentally better. Baker's book informs us incisively why Egypt's revolution has been not merely "uncertain," but certainly partial and halting at best. He does not tell us what a transforming revolution requires. Nobody tells us that these days. Most of us write about problems of improving order or overcoming disorder or even more carefully on the relatively smaller problems of orientations and decision making. We modestly wait for modern revolutionaries to provide us with empirical data about revolutionary practice. But these leaders are of very little help. They may take a few steps, but they do concentrate from the first day on consolidating the revolution. If there is ever to be a genuinely transforming revolution somewhere, it will gain its first critical and creative consciousness as it has always: someone will write a book. And the revolution will persist unless someone, once again, consolidates the book.

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Beware of revolutionaries who write books! (eg Qadaffi ...?)

Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology *by Gail M. Gerhart. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978. 364 pp. $14.50.*

Since his death in police custody during September 1977, Steven Biko has become an international hero, perhaps the most widely known South African black leader since Albert Lutuli won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1961. As Gail Gerhart's impressive history of black power politics in South Africa makes clear, it is insufficient to focus on Biko as a courageous and compelling individual who sparked a new generation's revolt against an intolerable system. Biko, and others whose names have not made the press, can best be understood as the continuers and developers of one line of resistance to white domination, a line deeply rooted in South African black society.

This line of resistance, which Gerhart calls "black power" or "orthodox African nationalism," has until the Soweto revolt commanded less attention than the "liberal" or "multiracist" line espoused by Lutuli and the African National Congress (ANC). A hallmark of the ANC has been its "realist" perspective on action within a social and political order dominated by a powerful white minority. From its beginning the ANC has welcomed alliance with sympathetic whites (and Asians and Coloureds), so as to be able to draw on their economic and organizational resources, and no doubt also on a certain amount of protection from official and unofficial harassment. Inevitably, it has stressed the liberal goal of a South Africa in which race would be a simple irrelevancy. Christianity has provided one powerful ideological underpinning for multiracialism; Marxism-Leninism has provided another. As the South African government has forced the ANC into clandestine and exile operations and closed off most hope for peaceful change toward a multiracial society, the organizational, financial, and ideological resources of the world's Marxist-Leninists have become increasingly relevant.

Black power has appealed not to the "realists" of South Africa, but to its "rebels," those concerned less with the need for protection and less with the long-term goals for society, and more with the means for bringing about a revolt of the African majority. For Anton